the Constitution fixed the meaning of the Contracts Clause for all cases arising across time. 11 Accordingly, Sutherland viewed the clause as a strict prohibition against mortgage moratoria, which no circumstance could alleviate.
The approaches of Hughes and Sutherland are but two extremes in constitutional interpretation. Though only two results were possible in the case -either the Act was constitutional or it was not -there are more than two methods by which an interpreter could reach those results. This Note explores possible ways of deciding Blaisdell, using the case as a vehicle for delimiting the boundaries of a positive constitutional command. As a sort of empirical investigation of legal philosophy, the Note examines how various interpretive theories affect an interpreter's approach to the case, and the results these theories might mandate. The Note's thesis is that Blaisdell was wrongly decided under any theory of interpretation. 12 After summarizing the Hughes and Sutherland opinions in Part I, the Note proceeds in Part II to discuss the application of three interpretive methods to Blaisdell: textualism, originalism, and contextualism. Part II concludes that all three methods mandate striking down the Minnesota law. Part III examines two schools of legal philosophy -positivism and natural law -to see how the case would be resolved under their respective conceptions of law. This Part questions whether either legal theory can justify the Court's result. Finally, Part IV uses legal realism to account for the Blaisdell decision. This Part argues that though realism accurately describes the Blaisdell decision, the theory normatively justifies the Court's opinion only if one agrees that the interpreter should be wholly unconstrained by positive law. Thus, the Note concludes that Blaisdell is an example of cases in which a court, striving to reach a desired result, ignored the law. 13 [Vol. 90:2534
I. A WALK THROUGH THE COURT'S OPINION
This Part offers a sketch of both the Court's and the dissent's reasoning in Blaisdell. 14 Section I.A mirrors Hughes' opinion, discussing the police power doctrine, original intent, Contracts Clause precedent, and principles of construction. Section I.B discusses Justice Sutherland's dissent. This Part also points out in passing several features of the two opinions which are significant to the investigation of interpretive methods and the legal philosophies underlying them.
A. Hughes' Opinion for the Court

Police Power and the Factor of Emergency
At the outset of his opinion, Chief Justice Hughes stressed that the police power of the states 15 is intrinsic to our federal structure and constitutional framework. The economic emergency, Hughes thought, could not serve to justify the existence of the police power: "Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved." 16 The opinion continued, however, by stating that emergency may justify the use, even if not the existence, of the police power. 17 Thus comes the first hint that the principle used to decide the case accommodates the social and political setting in which it arose; the existence of the Great Depression clearly overshadows Hughes' opinion.18 As he put it, " [t] he Constitutional question presented in light of an emergency is whether the power possessed embraces the particular exercise of it in response to particular conditions." 19 In other words, different social settings require different interpretations of the Constitution. 20 The Depression, presenting extremes in social conditions, justified extremes in interpretations of the law.
14. Chief Justice Hughes' majority opinion was joined by Justices Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo. Justice Sutherland wrote a dissenting opinion which was joined by the other "Four Horsemen": Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter, and Butler.
15. Police power consists of "the residual prerogatives of sovereignty which the states had not surrendered to the federal government." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-TIONAL LAW § 6-3, at 405 (2d ed. 1988).
16. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 425.
17. 290 U.S. at 426 ("While emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power.").
18. See 290 U.S. at 425; 1933 Minn. Laws 339 at 514-15 (preamble); infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
19. 290 U.S. at 426.
20. See Corwin, supra note 11, at 313 (" [T] he emergency met by the Minnesota statute is not the same type of emergency which the Convention of 1787 had in mind, and for the simple but irresistible reason that the social environment has essentially changed since then.").
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Original Understanding of the Contracts Clause
Hughes freely conceded the point to which Justice Sutherland's dissent devoted considerable effort: 21 the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium is the kind oflaw the Contracts Clause was meant to prevent. 22 The Framers were responding to a potential crisis caused by the passage of debtor-relief laws during the economic turmoil of the period following the Revolutionary War. 23 After acknowledging these facts, Hughes stated that the scope of the Contracts Clause might be narrower than indicated by the Framers' intent: "full recognition of the occasion and general purpose of the clause does not suffice to fix its precise scope .... [T] he prohibition [against state laws impairing contractual obligation] is not an absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula." 24 Hughes thought that some degree of impairment of contractual obligations is constitutionally permissible -regardless of the Framers' original understanding of the Contracts Clause.
Precedent
Early Contracts Clause precedent consisted of cases in which the Court struck down laws similar to the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium. 25 In considering the applicability of these cases to Blaisdell, Hughes argued that "[n]one of these cases ... is directly applicable to the question now before [the Court] in view of the conditions with which the Minnesota statute seeks to safeguard the interests of the mortgagee-purchaser . . . . " 26 Hughes had already stated that the Constitution must be read differently under different conditions. Because social conditions were different when earlier cases were decided, earlier reasoning might not be applicable to the current case. 27 This 21 . See 290 U.S. at 449-65 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 33 for example, perhaps he demonstrated obeisance to the Court's precedent, but to precedent subsisting in a realm beyond the confines of the Contracts Clause. Hughes used McCulloch as precedent not for a narrow and specific legal proposition, but rather to justify a mode of approaching and reasoning about constitutional cases. His method employs McCulloch as precedent of a special kind, using the case not for a rule of law that can be applied to the facts in Blaisdell, but rather for a principle of interpreting the Constitution. 34 As the next section explains, Hughes thought this principle could be legitimately applied in Blaisdell. 35 
Principles of Construction
Hughes justified his open-ended construction of the Contracts Clause by stating that "where constitutional grants and limitations of power are set forth in general clauses, which afford a broad outline, the process of construction is essential to fill in the details. Hughes explicitly rejected the originalist position "that what the provision of the Constitution meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our time." 37 Here Hughes quotes McCulloch v. Maryland: "We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding."38 In the course of discussing principles of construction Hughes took issue with Justice Sutherland's argument that the "meaning [of constitutional provisions] is changeless; it is only their application which is extensible." 3 9 It is not, the Chief Justice claimed, "helpful to attempt to draw a fine distinction between the intended meaning of the words of the Constitution and their intended application. "40 For Hughes, an interpreter could not fully understand what the provision means until confronted with a specific case, and until the interpreter has considered the social and political background which the case presents. That is, a constitutional provision is not entirely meaningful until the time of its application. If the Court is not constrained by any abstract preconceptions of a provision's meaning, one must wonder what constraints the Court does endure. 41 
B. Justice Sutherland's Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Sutherland concentrated on the Framers' condemnation of debtor-relief laws. Sutherland had this to say about the Minnesota law's constitutionality:
If it be possible by resort to the testimony of history to put any question of constitutional intent beyond the domain of uncertainty, the[ re is] ... no reasonable ground upon which to base a denial that the clause of the Constitution now under consideration was meant to foreclose state action impairing the obligation of contracts primarily and especially in respect of such action aimed at giving relief to debtors in time of emergency. 42 Sutherland's argument is precisely opposite the one made by Hughes, Textualism posits that, at least in some cases, a provision's text offers a resource sufficient for the interpretation of the law, and resolution of the case. 52 In such cases, an interpreter need look no further than that text; only when the interpreter has confronted and surmounted the threshold of ambiguous textual meaning should he seek interpretive guidance outside the provision's text. This section summarizes arguments that text should be a controlling interpretive referent, and then subjects the Contracts Clause to a textual analysis, concluding that it does indeed prohibit mortgage moratoria. To borrow a phrase from Professor Frederick Schauer, Blaisdell is an "easy case." 53 As Schauer explains, in juxtaposition to Professor Ronald Dworkin's attempt to explain how hard cases should be resolved, 54 not all constitutional provisions require a complex method of interpretation. 55 Schauer argues that "the nature of the language is an important factor in separating the hard cases from the easy cases. " 56 59 Moreover, where a judge is able to articulate such rules, he or she should do so; the alternative is for judges to "act[] more as fact-finders than as expositors of the law/' 60 Thus, if the Contracts Clause is clear and categorical, the Blaisdell Court should have articulated and followed the cognizable and coherent command flowing from the provision. That is, were it easy to determine when a state law impaired contractual obligation, then the Court's analysis should have proceeded no further.
The search for the Contracts Clause's meaning is fairly simple; as the following textual analysis reveals, the Contracts Clause is a provision of the clear and categorical variety. The obligation of a contract is the legal right or duty incurred by a party entering into a contractual agreement. 61 In the case of a mortgage, the mortgagor (the borrower) has the duty to make loan payments, and the mortgagee (the lender) has the right to collect them. To impair something means to make it worse, or to "diminish [the thing] in quantity, value, excellence, or strength." 62 To impair the obligation of a mortgage contract, then, would be to relieve the borrower of the duty to make payments, and to take from the lender the right to collect them. 63 The Blaisdell Court might have taken an easy way out of its quandary by claiming that the Minnesota law affected not the obligation of a contractual agreement, but the remedy for the breach of one. Contract remedies generally allow the victim of the breach to recover his or her expectation, reliance, or restitution interest in the contract. 64 That the Court did not discuss this option speaks to how plain it was that the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium impaired the obligation of contracts. 65 The Act did not merely forbid the mortgagee to sue for breach of contract, but rather provided for the mortgagor's alteration of the mortgage note's payment terms. Had the Act affected only the mortgagee's remedy (rather than the contractual obligation due it) the law would not have provided for the dissembling of the mortgage's terms, but instead would only have rendered it unenforceable. 66 Indeed, to impair the obligation -rather than the remedy -of a contract is to allow one party to breach, or partly breach, the agreement. This is precisely what the Minnesota law did. In fact, under the moratorium it was the breaching party who was to go to the courts for relief. 67 Repayment terms were established to satisfy the breaching party, not the victim of the breach. 68 The trial court simply told the obligee (the financial institution/mortgagee), in effect, that its right to collect mortgage payments had been abrogated. 69 Thus, the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium interfered with a privately created set of rights and duties -contractual obligations. The text of the Contracts Clause prohibits such interference.1°
In summary, the Contracts Clause is unambiguous in its textual mandate, and the consequences of that mandate on the constitutionality of mortgage moratoria are also unambiguous: the Constitution forbids them. The Court could only reach its Blaisdell result in spite of It is also significant that the mortgagor did not raise, and no court considered, contract defenses such as mutual mistake and impossibility. 69. 1933 Minn. Laws 339, pt. 2, § 2. The mortgagor was still required to make some payments, usually reflecting the value of the mortgaged property, rather than the value of the mortgage.
70. See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 52, at 538 (arguing that no matter how it is formulated, a rule's meaning is still clear; otherwise, rules could not exist).
[Vol. 90:2534 the textual mandate of the Contracts Clause. Only interpretive methods which either disregard, or pay very little heed to, a provision's text could sanction this result. The next two sections discuss analyses that, under this Note's view of textual meaning as a threshold inquiry, should not come into play in Blaisdell because of the overriding clarity of the Contracts Clause. Nonetheless, both Justice Sutherland and Chief Justice Hughes sought to make their respective uses of these two interpretive methods, originalism and contextualism.
B. Originalism
Originalism rests on the theory that the Constitution's legal mandate is informed by authority beyond its text: the Framers' intent. 71 Originalism assumes that the Constitution has a static meaning, and that that meaning is fixed by the intention of those who framed and adopted the document. 72 The originalist thinks that legal texts are not by themselves dispositive of what the law is, looking also to the Framers' intent to fill those gaps in the law. 73 This section attempts to determine what the Framers intended with respect to the Contracts Clause.
The Constitution's Framers did not extensively debate the Contracts Clause. In fact, there is no evidence that either the Framers or the Anti-Federalists paid much attention to the clause. 74 As a consequence, though the originalist analysis of the Contracts Clause is not disabled by competing visions of the clause offered by different Framers, the lack of much concrete evidence about the Framers' intentions regarding the clause hinders the originalist analysis. Indeed, most commentators have had to engage in some amount of speculation to conclude that the Contracts Clause was intended to prevent debtorrelief laws. The Contracts Clause was first offered to the Constitutional Convention by Rufus King of Massachusetts, presumably because the Federalists feared that state-enacted debtor-relief bills, many of which were aimed only at out-of-state creditors, would cripple the national economy. 76 Indeed, "one of the principal causes for the dissatisfaction with the prevailing state of affairs under the Confederation among the well-to-do classes was the mass of legislation in the states which was highly unwelcome to creditors as it was popular with debtors." 77 This dissatisfaction was not expressed on record at the Philadelphia Convention, however; delegates there made no mention of debtor-relief laws. 78 The Federalist hardly clarifies the Framers' intent regarding the Contracts Clause. Although Justice Sutherland claimed that the clause "was strongly defended in The Federalist," 79 in fact it was only mentioned twice, and then almost in passing. Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist Number 7, discussed the clause in the context of national unity: citizens of various states ought to be able to contract in other states without fear that legislative action will interfere with contractual rights. 80 James Madison, in The Federalist Number 44, included the Contracts Clause in an even more general discussion. Madison stated that, along with the ex post facto clause and the clause prohibiting bills of attainder, the Contracts Clause prevents retroactive legislative interference with items of "personal security and private rights." 81 This might suggest that the Contracts Clause, like the provisions it accompanies in Article 1, Section 10, should be read narrowly. Still, The Federalist, while consistent with the originalist position that the Contracts Clause was aimed at debtor-relief bills, does not support the specific proposition that the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium is precisely the kind of law the Contracts Clause is meant to prevent.
One aim of the Constitutional Convention was almost certainly to prevent legislative interference with private property. 82 Furthermore, the Framers were concerned with retroactive regulation of private conduct; 83 this is the purpose of the ex post facto clause, and it is no accident that the Contracts Clause appears with it and the prohibition 76 against bills of attainder. 84 All of these provisions prevent the state from retroactively interfering with private rights and duties. Unfortunately, these general positions are easier to establish, but less useful, than the specific proposition that the Contracts Clause was meant to prevent debtor-relief laws. The Convention did not accept the Contracts Clause when it was first proposed. 85 Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, among others, opposed it, "argu[ing] that such a provision would interfere with the passage of necessary legislation relating to the bringing of actions, laws thereby affecting contracts." 86 A similar reason given for opposing the Contracts Clause was that "this would be carrying the restraint too far; that cases would happen that could not be foreseen where some kind of interference would be essential." 87 In the end, however, these arguments did not prevail.
When the Committee on Style produced its final draft of the Constitution, the Contracts Clause had been inserted in Section 10 of article I. The clause "was now accepted by the convention without question," 88 although no one has ever adequately explained why the clause was ultimately inserted in the Constitution after having been first rejected. One writer attributes the presence of the clause entirely to the committee's main draftsman, Gouverneur Morris, previous opponent of the Contracts Clause, claiming that "he audaciously inserted" the provision after it "had been explicitly rejected by the convention." 89 By this argument Morris inserted the clause merely for the purpose of giving "the Bank of North America the subtle protection it sought, by preventing the legislature of Pennsylvania from again revoking its corporate charter -which was legally a contract. " 90 In short, the immediate reason for the insertion of the Contracts Clause in the Constitution is unclear. Nonetheless, even if the Contracts Clause is in the Constitution due to Morris' personal whim, commentators agree that most Framers intended it to prevent legisla- 84 . See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 81; WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 9-10 (Contracts Clause is in the Constitution because ex post facto clause was determined by the Framers not to apply to civil matters. To say, as did Chief Justice Hughes, that the prohibition of the Contracts Clause "is not an absolute one" 100 immediately raises extratextual considerations; from a textual perspective, the prohibition is an absolute one. 101 Hughes' idea suggests the possibility that textualism removes the clause from its place in the meaning of the Constitution taken as a whole. Perhaps in Blaisdell this means looking to the federal scheme established by the Constitution, to the Contracts Clause's place in the Constitution, and to conditions in the society which the Constitution protects. Such an inquiry into the context of the Contracts Clause necessitates balancing a state's exercise of police power102 against the Contracts Clause.
This balancing 1 o3 would focus on whether the state is reasonably exercising its police power, whether emergency conditions exist, and whether the state has carefully tailored its use of the police power to those emergency conditions. If the state's exercise of police power is reasonable, and does not violate the federal constitutional structure, then even a law which seems to violate the Constitution on its face could be upheld. Laws which impermissibly exceed the bounds of police power would be struck down. In theory, an interpreter who followed Hughes' method would not be able to use contextualism as an unprincipled catch-all for justifying results. 104 102. This inquiry is made all the more interesting by a consideration outside the scope of this Note: the police power is itself something that has arisen as an atextual concept within the framework of the Constitution. See TRIBE, supra note 15, § 6-3, at 405-06 (discussing the origins of the police power doctrine). The police power doctrine originally arose from structural considerations; the Court needed something to balance against a given constitutional provision. Otherwise, a given state practice -which seemed in itself worthwhile and harmless to the con- v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934) (striking down Alabama law similar in some respects to the Minnesota law on grounds that it was too broad and not adequately tailored to the emergency .at
If Blaisdell is indeed an exemplar of the method, then an interpreter could use contextualism to justify conflicting results. Perhaps Chief Justice Marshall endorsed this phenomenon when he stated in McCulloch that the constitution he was expounding was "a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." 105 This would also explain how the contextualist could reach a result contrary to the Framers' intent; a court cannot know what the law is until the time comes when it must be applied. Implicit in the Blaisdell opinion is that, one hundred years earlier, the case might have come out differently .106 Conditions then may not have justified the use of police power, or, more likely, the Court simply read the Contracts Clause differently in past eras.101
That Hughes cited McCulloch and that he sought to justify his reasoning in an atextual, nonoriginalist way does not, however, necessarily mean that his was the contextualist method. In fact, the Blaisdell Court's reasoning departs from the contextual method of McCulloch in several important ways. First, in McCulloch, the Court's .decision was not based on any particular Constitutional provision. Moreover, the decision does not run counter to the facial meaning of any part of the Constitution's text. Finally, and perhaps most subtle, is the fact that the Court's reasoning in McCulloch was of a rigid, almost formalistic character, and could only be used to reach one result. 1 os When Chief Justice Marshall noted that the power to tax was the power to destroy, and that Maryland had thus appropriated a power over the federal government by taxing the Bank of the United States, it followed that Maryland's law (that the Bank was subject to a state tax) was antithetical to the federal structure and therefore unconstitutional.109 In contrast to Hughes' analysis of the Minnesota law, Marshall engaged in no consideration of the Maryland law's value, nor did he weigh that value against the law's contrariness to the federal structure; McCulloch's contextualism does not entail balancing. 110 Morehand; among other things, the Alabama law had no end date). But see Schauer, Formalism, supra note 52, at 530 (noting the danger that judges will fail to heed rules and instead follow their "rule·independent judgment").
105 One cannot interpret a particular law without acceding, whether implicitly or explicitly, to some general theory of what law is. Nonetheless, many interpretive problems are similarly resolved by different theories. To use a well-known example, 112 if a law says "No vehicles in the park," both an interpreter who looks to the law's purpose and one who looks exclusively at its text will agree that automobile drivers are prohibited from using the park as a thoroughfare. These interpreters may disagree, however, over more subtle problems, such as whether a group of citizens may place a statue containing a jeep in the park, or whether a groundskeeper can bring a truck into the park to plant a tree.
This Part offers an analysis of two theories, positivism and natural law, which could justify three methods of interpreting a constitution: textualism, originalism, and contextualism. 113 This Part applies the two opposing theories of law to these methods, and examines how these theories would work to resolve the Blaisdell problem. Section III.A gives a brief introduction to positivism and natural law theories, and explains their relevance to Blaisdell Sections IIl.B and IIl.C focus on positivism and natural law respectively, and examine how adherence to those theories might affect a judge's view of Blaisdell. This Part concludes that interpreters hewing to either theory would likely conclude that the Minnesota law was unconstitutional.
A. constitutional interpretation. If the law contained in the Contracts Clause is merely the text of the provision and perhaps also the meaning ascribed to it by its framers, then one could read the Contracts Clause as a simple prohibition of the impairment of contracts. If, however, one thinks that not just the provision's language and the Framers' intent express the law that is the Contracts Clause, then one could think there is something more to the law than its words or framers' intent. The former view asserts that law can be given meaning before it is applied, and the latter that to give law meaning it must be put in context.
The basic dichotomy in the approaches offered by Hughes and Sutherland in Blaisdell is loosely captured in a fundamental debate over the relation of law and morality between Professors H.L.A. Hart and Lon L. Fuller, identified with positivism and natural law theory respectively . 114 Professor Fuller was concerned with the place of morality in law, arguing that one cannot tell what a law is (or means) until one has considered its moral content. Professor Hart claimed that law, though shaped by views of morality, itself has no moral content. Where Fuller would consider a wide range of factors in legal interpretation, Hart, though positing occasions on which these factors are legitimate fodder for the legal interpreter, would say that they have nothing to do with what the law is.
The debate about whether law is separate from morality is important to Blaisdell because the case raises this question: does an effort to interpret a law require any reference to moral (i.e., external), natural law concerns, or must it pay heed only to the positive command contained in the law? 115 Further, if reference to external concerns is legitimate, then how heavily should the interpreter weigh these external factors?
At first blush, the Contracts Clause may seem to present few, if any, moral concerns. When Professors Hart and Fuller touch on the question of obedience to law under the regime in Nazi Germany, 11 6 it is not difficult to see that this question presents a moral problem. The Contracts Clause does not present a problem on this scale, but both positivists and natural law theorists would see a moral character to the Contracts Clause, as with every legal provision. 117 The Contracts Clause has the moral aspect that all laws possess: the clause contributes to the ordering of the polity. 118 It renders predictable and smooth the machinations of commerce, and guarantees for our society orderly and reliable transactions. But the Contracts Clause also has a more specific moral aspect insofar as it protects expectations of the partjes to contract. In this aspect, the Contracts Clause rests on the moral maxim that parties should be entitled to rely on promises made to them. A central problem with the Minnesota law was that lenders relied on the sanctity of their mortgage contracts, but the law violated their trust. Another problem, however, was that which the law confronted. Economic conditions beyond farmers' control had deprived them of the ability to repay their mortgages. One can well sympathize with a mandate granting them some relief. Whether and how these moral concerns should affect an interpreter's legal judgment is a separate question, taken up in the next two sections.
The debate originated in well-known articles published in the
B. Hart and Positivism
Sensitive to charges that positivism was nothing more than rigid formalism, 119 Hart stressed that interpreters must often look beyond a law (i.e., its text) to know how to decide particular cases. 120 He drew a distinction between "core" and "penumbra[!]" legal problems. 121 Where there is a core of settled meaning, a law may easily and unambiguously be applied to a set of facts. No interpretive resource beyond the law's text is necessary. The logical deduction of textualism, however, cannot solve all interpretive problems. Penumbra! problems "arise outside the hard core of standard instances or settled meaning" -they arise, that is, when the interpreter is unable to determine what the particular words of the provision mean, i.e., when interpretation is not possible. 122 Hart suggests that judges should decide penumbra! cases by openly legislating -by looking to the appropriate social, moral, and political factors and deciding how the case should come out.123
118. See Epstein, supra note 12, at 717 ("Although the economic desirability of private con· tracts may at first glance appear far removed from the concerns of governance, the protection of private contracts against government regulation is inseparably entwined with two elements of a distinctly political cast: individual freedom, of which freedom to contract is but one illustration, and the need to prevent legislative misbehavior, itself a concern of any constitutional arrangement."). Suppose for a moment that Blaisdell is a penumbra! case. Hart would posit that the Supreme Court possesses what amounts to legislative power to decide whether or not it should strike down the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium. In this event, the interpreter can find no one right answer to the question of whether the Moratorium violates the Contracts Clause, because the provision is no longer in issue. The problem cannot be resolved with reference to it, and the case, being penumbra!, could reasonably come out either way. The Court could explicitly approve of the mortgage moratorium as a desirable public policy in light of the Depression (as Hughes must have done), or the Court could decide for some reason that the Minnesota law was so-: cially (that is, legislatively) undesirable, and reject it.
But see
Actually, an interpreter could characterize Blaisdell as a penumbra! case only with extreme difficulty. As section II.A argued, the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium represents a fairly standard and clear violation of the Contracts Clause. 124 Further, as a general rule, penumbra! cases arise only when the situation giving rise to the case was unanticipated by the provision at issue (that is, by its authors). 125 The Framers of the Constitution probably anticipated Blaisdell. 126 To say that the severity of the Depression distinguished Blaisdell from standard instances, necessitating a penumbra! approach, would stretch the argument. Social conditions are irrelevant in core cases, because extant law suffices to decide them; they can only be considered when a case enters the penumbra! zone, where social policy considerations can fill a void in the law.
Because Blaisdell is a core case, a judge deciding it cannot legitimately appropriate any legislative leeway. In core cases, by definition, it is always clear what the law is. Here, the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium is plainly unconstitutional because it is clear on the face of the Contracts Clause that the provision forbids mortgage moratoria. 127 Blaisdell is like most cases in that it is a case in which an interpreter can honestly reach only one possible result after applying the law to the facts of the case.12s
Hart describes the relation of morality to law like this: an individual may decide to obey or not to obey a given law for moral reasons, but the law itself is devoid of moral content. 129 A judge is bound to apply the law that is, not the law that ought to be. 128. See HART, supra note 115, at 138-42 (discussing the risk that an interpreter will ignore the law and consider external factors when such a consideration is unwarranted).
See id.
130. Note that Hart's positivism perceives the duty of judges to follow the law not as an [Vol. 90:2534 judge has no option: it is clear what the law is. As long as he or she is bound by the law, 131 a judge is bound to the textual approach; this is the approach under which mortgage moratoria are most plainly unconstitutional. The Contracts Clause would therefore constrain the positivist to decide Blaisdell in a certain way -reaching the same outcome as Justice Sutherland, even if not for the same reasons (in a core case a positivist would not care about original intent).
In sum, a positivist would find it difficult to claim that Blaisdell was correctly decided. Still, other legal theorists might decide the case differently. Blaisdell demonstrates what might be positivism's disadvantage: it forces unjust (or at least undesirable) outcomes as the price of rigid constraints on decisionmaking. The Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium may well have been desirable social policy, but the positivist analysis of Blaisdell does not reach that policy.
C. Fuller, Dworkin, and Natural Law 1. Fuller In contrast to Professor Hart, Professor Fuller thought that a law's purpose was a part of its content. Accordingly, Fuller emphasized "the notion of order [which] itself contains what may be called a moral element." 132 In this vein, Fuller discusses the "fabric of thought" necessary "to make the [law] a coherent, workable whole." 13 3 His basic argument was that one cannot interpret and understand a provision of law such as the Contracts Clause, no matter how clear it seems when one first reads it, unless one pays attention to this "fabric of thought," 134 which consists of what Fuller called "purpose and structure." 135 He added that "[t]idelity to law can become impossible if we do not accept the broader responsibilities (themselves purposive, as all responsibilities are and must be) that go with a purposive interpretation of law."136
Fuller's argument gains clarity when one considers his response to Hart's delineation of the core and the penumbra. 137 Fuller found the distinction meaningless. He disputed the assumption "that problems of interpretation typically turn on the meaning of individual abstract moral duty but simply as the judge's duty under the law, as what is requisite if a legal system is going to be maintained and adhered to. See id.
131. For example, a judge in Nazi Germany might not have been so bound. The problem of when or whether judges are ever not obligated by the law is beyond the scope of this Note, which assumes in all its discussions that judges intend to act within and according to the law.
132 words." 138 His argument was this: there is no core. All cases are penumbra!. The concept of standard instances is meaningless because every instance to which words in a legal provision are applied occurs in a different context than every other instance. A word in a provision, taken out of context, "is almost as devoid of meaning as the symbol 'X.' " 139
This argument puts the Contracts Clause in a new light. It lends credence to Chief Justice Hughes' claim that one cannot know what the clause means until presented with a specific interpretive problem.140 Under Hart's view, the Contracts Clause, being narrowly drawn, would engender mostly core cases. And Blaisdell would almost certainly be one of these. 141 Yet if Fuller is correct that cases typically do not turn on the meaning of individual words, then it is possible that a court deciding Blaisdell cannot help but take a broader look at the case.
Fuller acknowledged the possibility that interpreters could abuse this open interpretive method, twisting a law in a way conflicting not only with its text, but with its purpose:
One can imagine a course of reasoning that might run as follows: The statute says absinthe shall not be sold. What is its purpose? To promote health. Now, as everyone knows, absinthe is a sound, wholesome, and beneficial beverage.1 42 Therefore, interpreting the statute in light of its purpose, I construe it to direct a general sale and consumption of that most healthful of beverages, absinthe. 14 3 Obviously, as Fuller says, this sort of interpretation, which his purposive method risks, ought to be avoided. 144 · Perhaps the Court's reasoning in Blaisdell contains the abuse of interpretive discretion demonstrated by Fuller's absinthe example. Consider this argument: the Contracts Clause prohibits the impairment of the obligation of contracts, but it does so because the Framers wished to promote social order and economic stability. The Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium was enacted for these same reasons. Therefore it must be constitutional. If when the purposive method departs from the acceptable contextual meaning of a law. He says that the answer lies in the concept of structure. A statute or a rule of common law [and, presumably, a constitution] has, either explicitly, or by virtue of its relation with other rules, something that may be called a structural integrity. This is what we have in mind when we speak of "the intent of the statute," though we know it is men who have intentions and not words on paper. Within the limits of that structure, fidelity to law not only permits but demands a creative role from the judge, but beyond that structure it does not permit him to go.145
Fuller freely admits that his "purposive" search for the "structural integrity" of law amounts to a "common-sense" approach to interpretation.146 One wonders why such an approach could not have prevailed in Blaisdell. Even more than the absinthe statute, the Contracts Clause wears its purpose on its sleeve; common sense leaves no doubt about its facial purpose with respect to mortgage moratoria. 147
Dworkin
Fuller's use of the word "integrity" is prominently echoed by Professor Ronald Dworkin in Law's Empire. 148 Dworkin's general view of law is of "law as integrity." 149 Dworkin's ideal judge, adjudicating a constitutional controversy, would look beyond the text to "a variety of considerations offairness and integrity." 150 Dworkin is fond of saying that it is the duty of a judge to make the law "the best it can be." 151 To find "the best available interpretation [of the] American Constitution" and, presumably, provisions in it such as the Contracts Clause, Dworkin would consider "American constitutional text and practice as a whole," adding that the "judgment about which interpretation is best is sensitive to the great complexity of political virtues bearing on that issue."1 52 Thus, Dworkin would seek a maximized combination of substantive interpretation and "fit" into the American constitutional fabric.153 145. Id. Fuller echoed this argument -and justified its application in constitutional lawin The Morality of Law. See FULLER, supra note 133, at 102 (stating that "interpretation can often depart widely from the explicit words of the Constitution and yet rest secure in the conviction that it is faithful to an intention implicit in the whole structure of our government"); see also id. at 103 (approving use of the Contracts Clause to strike down laws that enhance the obligations of contracts). 154 This implies that either result might be the correct one, and that there are no "right" and "wrong" outcomes. Of course, there are cases in which, clearly, a judge could plausibly justify but one result. 155 In Blaisdell, however, overriding concerns of "fit" weigh against the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium's constitutionality. Hughes may have been right that upholding the Minnesota law is consistent with the "growing appreciation of public needs and ... the necessity of finding ground for a rational compromise between individual rights and public welfare." 156 Nonetheless, striking the law down would have been consistent with previous Supreme Court Contracts Clause jurisprudence, 157 (and Dworkin does give precedent significant weight 158 ), the Framers' intent, 159 as well as society's expectations. Moreover, striking down the law would have been consistent with the provision's text. While in Dworkin's analysis text may be just one coequal factor of several that are to be weighed, here it would have to be weighed heavily because of the clarity of the Contracts Clause's mandate on debtor relief. The natural law approach, then, must either identify the correct result when contrary ones can be justified, or it must demonstrate that a method capable of reaching contrary results is valid nonetheless. Dworkin responds to the criticism:
Law as integrity ... not only permits but fosters different forms of substantive conflict or tension within the overall best interpretation of law .... We accept integrity as a distinct political ideal, and we accept the adjudicative principle of integrity as sovereign over law, because we want to treat ourselves as an association of principle, as a community governed by a single and coherent vision of justice and fairness and procedural due process in the right relation .... [ Dworkin argues that there is a level of integrity in law beyond substantive coherence; this "different, more abstract calculation" he calls "pure integrity." 16 1 Dworkin has presented an abstract concept indeed, but it clearly displays one crucial aspect: like Fuller, a major factor in Dworkin's calculus is justice, "the right outcome of the political system." 162 Assuming that such a thing as "pure integrity" exists, Hughes' Blaisdell opinion arguably fails to meet the standard. Given that the result reached in the case could not have "fit" less easily into either the legal landscape preceding it 163 or conventional readings of the provision, 164 one must question whether any substantive outcome -no matter how desirable -could justify the Blaisdell result. Some may have felt in 1934 that the Supreme Court controlled the fate of the Republic, and some certainly felt that the Minnesota law was urgently necessitated by social unrest. 165 Nonetheless, a court could achieve the Blaisdell result only through a practical abeyance of the Constitution. Natural law theory justifies the Court's opinion only if one ignores the fact that, as Part II demonstrated, the Hughes opinion does not fit into the fabric of American law.
IV. BLAISDELL: EXEMPLAR OF REALISM
The language of the law, wrote Jerome Frank, is the language of "rationalization," which is "the normal human way of avoiding recognition of ... conflict." 166 This Part argues that such was the language of Chief Justice Hughes' opinion in Blaisdell While the Constitution mandated overturning the mortgage moratorium, political pressures and social need pushed the Court to uphold it. Section IV.A provides a sketch of legal realism, and section IV.B explains how realism accounts for the Court's opinion in Blaisdell This Part concludes that the Chief Justice wrote an opinion that, seeming to reconcile the warring demands of law and society, in reality only offered a false resolution of the conflict.
A. A Thumbnail Sketch of Realism
Like all academic trends, legal realism was a somewhat amorphous school of thought. Nonetheless, certain basic notions may be collected 160 Furthermore, some realists thought judges should use leeway to make social judgments -policy choices -when confronted with the inherent ambiguity of legal language. Felix Cohen articulated the impetus for realism's normative component when he expressed his frustration over the fact that lawyers and judges use legal concepts to obscure practical questions, and "forget the social forces which mold the law and the social ideals by which the law is to be judged."17 6 As Frank put it, "[m]uch of the uncertainty of law is not an unfortunate accident: it is of immense social value." 177 If legal decisionmaking really were an exercise in formal, deductive logic, where results ineluctably followed from predicate propositions, then judges would be unable to shape the law to best serve the social good; law could not adequately respond to society's needs.17 8 Though the realists lauded law's malleability, they did not necessarily think this pliancy unlimited. In an appendix to Law and the Modern Mind entitled "Rule-Fetichism and Realism," Frank wrote that "[t]he will of the judge is to be directed to the just and reasonable results within the limits of the positive rule of law. " 179 Similarly, Llewellyn wrote that realism urged "not the elimination of rules, but the setting of words and paper in perspective." 180 That is, the abandonment of a rule fetish is not necessarily tantamount to the abandonment of rules; even for the realists, the positive law imposed constraints on legal decisionmaking.
Thus, though worlds apart in most aspects, realists and textualists181 suddenly seem to share loosely one fundamental notion about the limits of legal interpretation. Like textualists, realists thought written law imposes some constraint on legal decisionmaking, even if the two camps would differ over the degree of the constraint. Moreover, Hart and Fuller both expressed similar views, agreeing that in most cases the law allows only one result. 182 And all of the commonly used interpretive methods presented in Part II take as axiomatic that rules exist and should be, in varying ways, followed. 183 What is significant is that the realists were not nihilists; they merely described how judges do and should work within the law, and did not advocate that judges work outside it. Thus, as the next section explains, while realism can explain the result in Blaisdell, it may not condone that result.
B. Blaisdell, Realism, and the Constitution
Finding the realist explanation for Blaisdell is all the easier because Chief Justice Hughes himself gave a realist account of the Court's decision when he claimed that the Contracts Clause was the sort of openruns enlightened self-interest, and results in action apparently headed (often purposefully) for the common good").
178 Strong social pressures to uphold the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium undeniably existed. The law was one of many pieces of moratory legislation enacted with the onslaught of the Depression. 187 It was passed after "a general outcry for relief" which included instances of mob violence and a march on St. Paul.18 8 This outcry had been prompted by a farm crisis resulting in "a constantly mounting wave of foreclosures and forced sales." 189 Lenders were able to take advantage of farmers at foreclosure sales, paying paltry sums for what ordinarily would have been valuable property. 190 In short, were there ever a time and place in which debtor relief was justified, Minnesota in the early 1930s would have been it. 191 The Minnesota legislature enacted the mortgage moratorium for legitimate reasons and with a nondiscriminatory intent. Unlike post-Revolutionary War debtor-relief laws, with which states intended to protect their citizens against out-of-state creditors, the Minnesota law only regulated mortgages in the state of Minnesota. Arguably the law was not intended to protect debtors at the expense of creditors, but rather to preserve and protect Minnesota's farm economy. That is, the law was intended to accomplish a legitimate policy goal. Moreover, the law was drawn so as to give creditors what the mortgagors could pay; it did not wholly abrogate (even if it did impair) the mortgagor's obligation on the contract. 192 The mortgage moratorium was, in sum, justifiable from a policy perspective.
Given that Blaisdell's result was politically desirable, the question crucial to resolution of this Note's thesis is whether the relevant law, easy to justify whatever result the Court chose to reach. Second, be-cause the Court was free to import moral and social considerations into its analysis, the case is easy to resolve given that racial discrimination is indisputably immoral.
Brown is arguably faithful to, and certainly does not contravene, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. 202 People may have thought that the Fourteenth Amendment either permitted or forbade the segregation of schools, but they could not have thought this because of what the text of the document said on its face; the Fourteenth Amendment does not mention school (de)segregation at all, whereas the Contracts Clause explicitly governs state impairment of contractual obligations. 203 As in Blaisdell political need informed the Court's opinion in Brown. Chief Justice Warren declared that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal" only after reviewing the social data concerning the education of the different races. 204 Just as the Depression justified mortgage moratoria, the negative effects of segregation on black school children justified desegregation.
The crucial difference between Brown and Blaisdell, however, lies in the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment on its face does not mandate segregated schools. Rather, the expectation (and fact) of segregated schools existed because of the way in which the Supreme Court had interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment. 205 Furthermore, the Brown Court made no attempt to reconcile its decision with conflicting precedent, but instead simply overruled it. 20 6 Restated, then, the ultimate, crucial difference between Brown and Blaisdell is that in Brown there was an interstitial void in the relevant law, i.e., the Fourt~enth Amendment, that the nine justices of the Supreme Court, acting as judicial policy makers, could fill without rendering a result inconsistent with that law. In Blaisdell the Court had no such gap in the law at its disposal. As this Note has demonstrated, from almost every perspective, the Contracts Clause condemns mortgage moratoria. This condemnation arises because every analysis confronts the clause's unavoidable stricture against the impairment of contractual obligation. Were the clause vague or ambiguous, a Court might find gaps allowing it interpretive leeway. But the [Vol. 90:2534 clause is clear, and no legitimate method of interpretation provides the leeway needed to support the Court's result in Blaisdell CONCLUSION To argue that Blaisdell was wrongly decided is not necessarily to make a claim that is broad in scope. Put another way, recourse to only the textualist method is not necessarily always, nor even frequently, the only appropriate means to achieving right results. In cases where the law does offer a clear textual command, however, if that command is not followed then neither is the law. Inconsistent interpretations of text may, as Dworkin argues, retain coherence in a broad sense. 207 And not all legal interpretations must be rigidly consistent; however, inconsistent interpretations cannot maintain a coherent legal system where only one interpretation is plausible.
One might think, then, that Chief Justice Hughes was right to say that the Contracts Clause (and all constitutional provisions) should be read differently at different times. Indeed, one reading of Blaisdell is that the Court's opinion was wise, farseeing, and appropriate for its time. In Parts II and III, however, this Note employed a manifold of interpretive perspectives to demonstrate that Blaisdell's interpretation of the Contracts Clause is legally baseless not merely because it is inconsistent with other substantive interpretations of the clause, but because the essence of the Hughes Court's opinion was to ignore the law. In Blaisdell, only one interpretation of the Contracts Clause was plausible. Part IV augmented this conclusion by showing how the Court's holding would have been appropriate only if the Contracts Clause had left gaps for judicial legislation. Since the application of the clause to mortgage moratoria is clear, Blaisdell was rightly decided only if an interpreter may legitimately pay no heed to positive law.
